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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
This case requires us to determine the minimum 
conduct in which a defendant must engage in order to qualify 
for a two-level enhancement pursuant to Sentencing 
Guidelines § 3C1.2 (“§ 3C1.2”), for recklessly creating a 
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another 
3 
 
person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement 
officer. 
 Defendant Dwayne Cespedes appeals the 144-month 
sentence he received after pleading guilty to armed robbery 
and related offenses.  Specifically, Cespedes objects to the 
District Court’s enhancement of his sentence for recklessly 
endangering others while fleeing from law enforcement 
officers pursuant to § 3C1.2 based purely upon his 
participation in a conspiracy to commit armed robbery, when 
he was merely a passenger in the car which was being driven 
recklessly by his co-conspirator.  Given the language of the 
relevant guideline provisions, we agree with Cespedes and 
will therefore remand for re-sentencing without the 
enhancement.  
I.  Background 
Cespedes and two confederates planned and executed 
an armed robbery of the KNBT Bank in Whitehall, 
Pennsylvania.  Cespedes and one of his co-conspirators, 
Michael Grant, entered the bank armed with guns, while the 
other accomplice, Curtis Whitehurst, waited outside in a 
getaway car.   
While in the bank, Cespedes showed his weapon to the 
bank’s teller, stating “it is what it is,” as Grant opened the 
cash drawer and removed its contents.  Cespedes then pointed 
the weapon at the teller and gave her thirty seconds to tell 
them where the rest of the bank’s money was located.  The 
robbers then removed more money from the bank safe before 
exiting with $22,467 in cash. 
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Cespedes and Grant then entered the getaway car 
driven by Whitehurst.  Rather than submit to an attempted 
traffic stop, Whitehurst engaged police in a high speed chase 
through residential neighborhoods that spanned two counties.  
Eventually, Cespedes and Grant got out and fled on foot, after 
which Whitehurst continued his reckless driving.  Whitehurst 
ignored traffic laws, running stop signs and traveling in the 
wrong direction on certain roads.  At one point during the 
chase, Whitehurst nearly struck innocent bystanders walking 
in a crosswalk.  Eventually, Whitehurst collided with a parked 
minivan before being struck by a police cruiser while 
attempting to reverse. 
Cespedes was apprehended after a short pursuit on 
foot.  A gun was recovered under a trash can lid in the 
vicinity of where Cespedes fled.  The bank teller later 
positively identified him as the robber who pointed a gun at 
her.   
A grand jury returned a three-count indictment against 
Cespedes, charging him with the following offenses: 
conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371; armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2113(d); and use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime 
of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).  Cespedes 
pleaded guilty to all three counts. 
Consistent with the recommendation in Cespedes’ 
Presentence Investigation Report, the District Court applied a 
two-level enhancement for recklessly endangering others 
while fleeing from law enforcement officers pursuant to § 
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3C1.2.1
                                              
1 Section 3C1.2 provides:  “If the defendant recklessly 
created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to 
another  person  in  the   course   of   fleeing   from   a   law  
  The District Court rejected Cespedes’ objection that 
the enhancement was improper because he never possessed 
enforcement officer, increase by 2 levels.” 
 
With respect to the enhancement, the Presentence 
Investigation Report focused upon Whitehurst’s conduct 
during  the  high  speed  chase.   The  report  contained  the  
following justification for the enhancement: 
 
The defendants led Whitehall 
Township Police Department on a 
high speed chase through a 
residential area of Whitehall, 
Pennsylvania, and ending in 
Allentown, Pennsylvania, during 
mid-morning hours.  During this 
pursuit, Whitehurst ignored traffic 
laws, running stop signs and 
traveling in the wrong direction.  
In one instance, Whitehurst 
almost struck innocent bystanders 
crossing the road in the crosswalk.  
Whitehurst crashed the getaway 
vehicle into a parked minivan and, 
while attempting to reverse the 
vehicle, was struck by a police 
cruiser.  This reckless conduct 
created a substantial risk of death 
or serious bodily injury to both 
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any control over the recklessly driven getaway vehicle, and 
had exited on account of Whitehurst’s erratic driving.  During 
the sentencing hearing, the District Court reasoned as follows: 
There was a violation of traffic 
control devices before Mr. 
Cespedes got out.  So, he may not 
have been in the car for the entire 
chase, but he certainly was there 
for part of it, and the chase really 
was a chase in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, and he is a 
conspirator. . . .  I understand that 
he wasn’t driving the car, but he’s 
complicit in that.  He’s as 
responsible as Mr. Whitehurst is 
because he is a co-conspirator. 
 
J.A. 85-86.  Application of the enhancement raised the 
Guidelines range for Cespedes’ robbery counts from 41-51 
months to 51-63 months.  When added to the mandatory 84-
month sentence for Cespedes’ firearm count, the 
enhancement resulted in a final Guidelines range of 135-147 
months.  The District Court ultimately sentenced Cespedes to 
                                                                                                     
the law enforcement personnel 
involving the pursuit, as well as 
innocent (sic) bystanders along 
the route.  Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
3C1.2, two levels are added to the  
offense level. 
 
PSR ¶ 22. 
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144 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years’ 
supervised release. 
 The instant appeal followed. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court possessed jurisdiction pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 “When reviewing a sentence, an appellate court must 
ensure that the district court ‘committed no significant 
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly 
calculating) the Guidelines range.’”  United States v. Aquino, 
555 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).  “We review the District 
Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, 
and scrutinize any findings of fact for clear error.”  Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
III.  Discussion 
 Cespedes presents a two-step argument as to why the 
District Court erred by enhancing his sentence pursuant to § 
3C1.2.  First, Cespedes argues that the general conduct 
provision in Guidelines § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (“§ 
1B1.3(a)(1)(B)”), which permits sentences to be enhanced 
based upon the reasonably foreseeable acts of others, does not 
apply to § 3C1.2.  Second, Cespedes argues that Application 
Note 5 (“Note 5”) to § 3C1.2 required the Government to 
prove that he “aided[,] abetted, counseled, commanded, 
induced, procured, or willfully caused” Whitehurst’s reckless 
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driving, which it failed to do.  We will consider each of these 
arguments in turn. 
A. 
 As a general matter, the Sentencing Guidelines permit 
a defendant’s sentence to be enhanced based not only upon 
his own conduct, but also upon the conduct of his criminal 
confederates.  Specifically, § 1B1.3(a) states: 
Unless otherwise specified, . . . 
adjustments in Chapter Three . . . 
shall be determined on the basis 
of the following: (1)(A) all acts 
and omissions committed, aided, 
abetted, counseled, commanded, 
induced, procured, or willfully 
caused by the defendant; and (B) 
in the case of a jointly undertaken 
criminal activity (a criminal plan, 
scheme, endeavor, or enterprise 
undertaken by the defendant in 
concert with others, whether or 
not charged as a conspiracy), all 
reasonably foreseeable acts and 
omissions of others in furtherance 
of the jointly undertaken criminal 
activity, that occurred during the 
commission of the offense of 
conviction, in preparation for that 
offense, or in the course of 
attempting to avoid detection or 
responsibility for that offense[.] 
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U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (emphasis added).  By including the 
phrase “unless otherwise specified,” the relevant conduct 
provision admits of exceptions to application of § 
1B1.3(a)(1)(B)’s reasonable foreseeability test in certain 
instances.  Cespedes contends that § 3C1.2 is one such 
instance.  
Pursuant to § 3C1.2, a defendant’s sentence can be 
increased two levels “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a 
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another 
person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement 
officer.”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2.  Note 5 to § 3C1.2 provides the 
following commentary:  
Under this section, the defendant 
is accountable for the defendant’s 
own conduct and for conduct that 
the defendant aided or abetted, 
counseled, commanded, induced, 
procured, or willfully caused.   
 
Id. at cmt. n.5 (emphasis added).  The question, then, is 
whether, by specifically describing when a defendant can be 
held responsible for reckless endangerment caused by another 
during flight based upon something other than reasonable 
foreseeability, § 3C1.2 “specifies otherwise” such that § 
1B1.3(a)(1)(B) does not apply. 
 Note 5 makes clear that, to qualify for an enhancement 
under § 3C1.2, a defendant must have either himself 
recklessly endangered others, or “aided[,] abetted, counseled, 
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused” 
another’s reckless endangerment of others.  It therefore 
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specifically describes the conduct that will render a defendant 
responsible for another’s recklessness during flight from law 
enforcement.  See United States v. Chong,  285 F.3d 343, 346 
(4th Cir. 2002).  Although set forth in commentary to § 
3C1.2, we must consider Note 5 authoritative “unless it 
violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent 
with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”  Id. at 
345-46 (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 
(1993)).  Application of a § 3C1.2 enhancement based upon 
the reasonable foreseeability of a confederate’s reckless 
endangerment during flight – using the generally applicable 
standard of § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) – runs afoul of Note 5’s 
limitation by enhancing a defendant’s sentencing without him 
having engaged in the specific conduct set forth with respect 
to the reckless endangerment.2
                                              
2 Further militating in favor of our interpretation is the 
companion sub-section of § 1B1.3(a)(1).  Section 
1B1.3(a)(1)(A) allows enhancements to be “determined on 
the basis of . . . all acts and omissions committed, aided, 
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or 
willfully caused by the defendant.”  U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).  Absent Note 5, then, a 
defendant’s sentence could still be enhanced pursuant to § 
3C1.2 if he “aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, 
procured, or willfully caused” an accomplice’s reckless 
endangerment of others during flight.  Note 5 would therefore 
be unnecessary if not meant to cabin the circumstances in 
which a defendant’s sentence may be enhanced based upon 
the recklessness of another by preventing application of § 
1B1.3(a)(1)(B).  The contrary interpretation urged by the 
Government – that Note 5 was included in § 3C1.2 merely for 
emphasis and not for any substantive purpose – would render 
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 Accordingly, we join all of our sister circuit courts of 
appeals that have considered this issue in reasoning that 
“some form of direct or active participation which is 
consistent with . . . Note [5] is necessary in order for § 3C1.2 
to apply.”  United v. Cook, 181 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 
1999); see also Chong, 285 F.3d at 346; United States v. 
Conley, 131 F.3d 1387, 1390-91 (10th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Lipsey, 62 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1995).  
“Thus, in the case of a defendant who was a passenger during 
a flight from police, a district court ‘must specify in the 
record its reasons for holding [that defendant] responsible for 
the driver’s conduct.’”  United States v. Wilfong, 475 F.3d 
                                                                                                     
Note 5 a mere nullity.  See United States v. Cook, 181 F.3d 
1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 The Government contends that Illustration (b)(1) to § 
1B1.3 supports finding that § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) applies to the 
reckless-endangerment-during-flight enhancement.  The 
illustration makes a getaway driver in an armed bank robbery 
accountable for injuries caused by his co-conspirators during 
the robbery.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 2.  The Government 
suggests that “it would be anomalous to hold a participant in a 
robbery liable for an accomplice’s assault on a teller, but 
create a different rule for an accomplice’s reckless 
endangerment of others during flight, which poses exactly the 
same danger of bodily injury to innocent persons.”  Appellee 
Br. at 17.  We disagree.  The illustration merely demonstrates 
how the reasonable foreseeability analysis operates when the 
relevant conduct provision in § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) applies.  It is 
not at all instructive with respect to the predicate question of 
which enhancements § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) applies to, which is the 
issue here considered.  See Cook, 181 F.3d at 1236 n.1. 
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1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting 
United States v. Young, 33 F.3d 31, 33 (9th Cir. 1994)).   
 Here, the District Court relied upon Cespedes’ 
participation in a conspiracy with the reckless getaway driver 
to enhance his sentence pursuant to § 3C1.2, stating, “He’s as 
responsible as Mr. Whitehurst is because he is a co-
conspirator.”  J.A. 86.  The conclusion that a § 3C1.2  
enhancement is proper based solely upon a defendant’s entry 
into a conspiracy is inadequate because it does not indicate 
how that defendant “aided[,] abetted, counseled, commanded, 
induced, procured, or willfully caused” the recklessness upon 
which the enhancement is predicated.  See Lipsey, 62 F.3d at 
1136 (deeming the “community of interest among all three 
defendants in the car to escape” insufficient to justify 
application of § 3C1.2). 
 In effect, the District Court enhanced Cespedes’ 
sentence based upon the mere foreseeability of Whitehurst’s 
reckless driving.3
B. 
  Pursuant to Note 5, though, the fact that the 
reckless driving may have been reasonably foreseeable is not 
determinative.  Therefore, the basis upon which the District 
Court applied § 3C1.2 to Cespedes’ sentence was insufficient 
as a matter of law. 
 The Government urges that evidence introduced 
against Cespedes, along with findings in unrelated portions of 
the sentencing record, suggest that the District Court properly 
                                              
3 Indeed, the Government acknowledges in its brief 
that “part of the district court’s remarks focused on the 
reasonable foreseeability test.”  Appellee Br. at 18. 
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applied § 3C1.2, even in light of Note 5.  However, our 
consideration of the record as a whole demonstrates that 
Cespedes’ conduct did not qualify him for the reckless-
endangerment-during-flight enhancement, as interpreted 
above. 
 The proof to which the Government points as 
demonstrating that Cespedes was  responsible for 
Whitehurst’s recklessness primarily relates to the level of 
planning involved in his offense.  The only evidence specific 
to Cespedes’ role in planning the crime was that he learned 
when best to commit the robbery from a former bank 
employee with whom he was acquainted.  J.A. 113.  That by 
itself, however, is inadequate to justify a § 3C1.2 
enhancement because it does not relate at all to Cespedes’ 
responsibility for Whitehurst’s recklessness during the 
getaway.  Indeed, the only proof as to how the conspirators 
prepared for the getaway made clear that Whitehurst obtained 
the vehicle used to flee the scene from a friend who rented it 
several days before the robbery.  PSR ¶ 11.  Cespedes’ role in 
planning the robbery, without more, does not render him 
accountable for the reckless endangerment of others caused 
by Whitehurst’s reckless driving. 
 Observations made by the District Court, which the 
Government argues further support upholding application of 
the enhancement to Cespedes, suffer from a similar infirmity 
and do nothing to bolster its position.  The District Court 
explained its determination that Cespedes’ offense was 
particularly disturbing by emphasizing “the circumstances 
before in planning this, getting the guns, [and] getting the 
car,” as well as the “foot pursuit” that occurred after Cespedes 
“asked to get out of the car.”  J.A. 113-114.  Again, though, 
these findings do not demonstrate anything about Cespedes’ 
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conduct that would show that he “aided[,] abetted, counseled, 
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused” 
Whitehurst’s reckless endangerment of others during flight 
from the police.  Since there is no evidence of any such 
conduct here, the enhancement does not apply by its terms. 
 Proof indicating only that conspirators collectively 
planned a robbery that led to a high speed chase is inadequate 
to qualify each passenger in the getaway vehicle for a 
reckless-endangerment-during-flight enhancement.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Franklin, 321 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (9th Cir. 
2003) (finding that inclusion of getaway cars as part of 
robbery plan does not demonstrate a defendant’s 
responsibility for reckless endangerment).  Therefore, 
because the evidence and findings as to Cespedes’ 
involvement in the reckless getaway lacked specificity as to 
what rendered him responsible for Whitehurst’s reckless 
driving, we hold that the Government did not satisfy its 
burden of proving him subject to § 3C1.2, i.e., it did not show 
that Cespedes’ conduct constituted a “form of direct or active 
participation which is consistent with . . . Note [5].”  Cook, 
181 F.3d at 1235. 
 “[W]here the government has the burden of production 
and persuasion as it does on issues like enhancement of the 
offense level . . . , its case should ordinarily have to stand or 
fall on the record it makes the first time around [and it] 
should not normally be afforded a second bite at the apple.”  
United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 832 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, 
our conclusion prohibits application of the reckless-
endangerment-during-flight enhancement to Cespedes’ 
sentence upon resentencing by the District Court. 
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IV.  Conclusion 
 In sum, the evidence and the form of the District 
Court’s findings make it evident that Cespedes’ sentence was 
erroneously enhanced pursuant to § 3C1.2.  We therefore 
vacate the sentence and remand to the District Court for 
resentencing without the enhancement.     
